On evolutionary selection of blackjack strategies by Goykhman, Mikhail
On evolutionary selection of blackjack strategies
Mikhail Goykhman
Racah Institute of Physics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
Jerusalem, 91904, Israel
E-mail: michael.goykhman@mail.huji.ac.il ‡
Abstract.
We apply the approach of evolutionary programming to the problem of optimization
of the blackjack basic strategy. We demonstrate that the population of initially random
blackjack strategies evolves and saturates to a profitable performance in about one
hundred generations. The resulting strategy resembles the known blackjack basic
strategies in the specifics of its prescriptions, and has a similar performance. We
also study evolution of the population of strategies initialized to the Thorp’s basic
strategy.
1. Introduction
The game of blackjack has received a considerable attention from game theorists (and
professional gamblers) during the recent decades. The original work which has initiated
such an active interest in blackjack was published in [1], and [2, 3]. In [1] it has been
shown that following the prescribed set of rules the player can get almost even with
the dealer, reducing the casino’s edge to just about 0.62%. § Later [3] refined the
edge estimate for the strategy of [1] to the player’s advantage of 0.09%. Thorp also
improved the prescription of [1], and claimed that, under certain specific game rules,
player following the Thorp’s optimized basic strategy has 0.12% edge over the casino.
The player’s edge can go up to 0.6% under more favorable casino rules (the edge can
further increase to about 2% if the natural pays 2:1, which we will not be considering
in this paper). The term basic strategy implies that the player makes its decisions
taking into account only its own cards and the dealer’s up-card, without taking into
consideration any other information, such as the cards which have already been played.
Such a small advantage of the basic strategy makes the game practically even. This
is essentially different from the other games against the house, known for a substantial
player’s disadvantage (such as 5.26% disadvantage in the roulette game with 38 pockets,
having one zero and one double-zero), resulting in the certain long-term ruin for the
gamblers.
‡ goykhman89@gmail.com
§ An edge (positive or negative) of p% means that for every dollar the player bets it is expected to
(make or lose) |p| cents.
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Moreover, Thorp has demonstrated, see [2, 3], that removing some cards from the
deck, the player, following the corresponding version of the basic strategy, gets the
higher/smaller edge over the house. The most significant effect is when the fives are
removed from the deck, giving player the edge of 3.58% under the corresponding most
optimal basic strategy, see [2, 3]. Therefore, as some rounds of the game are played,
and the cards are removed from the deck (in most of the blackjack games the played
cards remain discarded until the deck is exhausted or substantially depleted, in other
words, blackjack is not a game of independent trials), the player can adjust the size it
bets in accordance with the edge it expects to have on the next round of play. Thorp
has devised a counting strategy which assigns weights to the cards, so that as the player
sees the dealt cards, it adds up their total weight, thereby calculating the count of the
remaining deck. This count tells the player whether the deck is expected to give the
player an advantage, and if yes, the player bets more. Furthermore, the player can op-
timize its play by using a variant of the basic strategy adjusted to the specific depleted
deck, see [2, 3]. Subtle issues exists as to how the player should conceal its advantage
play, to avoid negative reaction and counter-measures from the casino employees, which
we will not be discussing in this paper, referring reader to [3].
The goal of this paper is to develop and employ a numerical simulation method
for constructing and exploring optimal blackjack strategies. Simulation methods have
been routinely used for the blackjack research, including the original work by [2, 3]
(see also [4]). The idea is that simulating a sufficiently large number of hands one
can estimate the edge which any given strategy will give to the player. Typically one
starts by testing a specific basic strategy, and then extends this approach to studying
the counting strategies. The starting point for the strategy search can be taken as the
prescription of [1]. One then adds some variations on top of it, and verifies whether the
resulting performance improves or not. Similarly, one develops the optimal strategies
and calculates the corresponding player’s edge for the decks which have some of the
card ranks depleted (relatively to the size of the deck), or totally missing, as described
in [2, 3].
The basic strategy optimization search therefore has two essential steps. One starts
with some known basic strategy, and, first, reasons what parts of it could be altered
in hope of obtaining a better performance. Second, one runs a simulation in order to
calculate performance of the so obtained new strategy. If the first step is replaced with
a brute force search over the parameters of the basic strategy, the time needed to solve
the problem of finding the optimal basic strategy will increase exponentially with the
number of parameters one desires to tweak. If one is planning to brute force search over
the entire set of blackjack basic strategy parameter space, the search will take about
2620 ∼ 10186 steps, unfeasible for any computational resources (the origin of this estimate
is discussed in section 2).
We suggest to get around this problem by applying the ideas of evolutionary
computation to the problem of optimization of blackjack strategies. Previous work on
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evolutionary selection of blackjack strategies can be found in [5], which used evolutionary
selection to find an optimal neural network, used to analyze the blackjack game,
and [6], which applied evolutionary selection directly to the population of blackjack
strategies (see also [7], [8] and references therein). We propose a framework to encode
the blackjack strategy into the chromosome, and prescribe the fitness, selection, and
replication rules for the strategy chromosomes. We discuss how tuning parameters of
the evolutionary selection one can improve the evolutionary performance. It turns out
that the evolutionary optimization search saturates well below 1000 evolutionary steps,
and works well on the population of only 5000 strategies, making the problem easily
solvable with the contemporary computational resources.
To search for an optimal blackjack basic strategy evolutionary we suggest two
approaches. In the first approach we start from the population of randomly initialized
strategies, and let it evolve for 1000 generations. We choose the amount of money
which the strategy generates (after N = 104 rounds of play, betting b = $2 per round)
as its fit score, selecting and breeding the top 5% of strategies which generate the most
money. We observe that the fit score quickly saturates in about 100 evolutionary steps.
The resulting strategy performs similarly well to the Thorp’s basic strategy, and is very
resembling of it in the specifics. However, some of the detailed prescriptions, such as
some of the split and double down prescriptions, are different for the Thorp’s and the
evolved basic strategy derived in this paper.
We suggest that in the evolutionary setup of this paper, with N = 104 rounds
of b = $2 bet per round, some of the changes in the strategy parameters can appear
relatively non-influential. This can result in an impression that several distinct blackjack
basic strategies perform similarly well, and are practically indistinguishable. Specifically
this is reflected in the fact that we cannot arrive at a statistically significant rejection
of the null hypothesis, stating that two strategies (such as, the Thorp’s and the evolved
basic strategy) perform differently on average. This artifact can be removed, provided
we use a larger number of the game roundsN , at expense of increasing the computational
time. In that case the difference in performance between any two distinct basic strategies
can be made as large as desired, as we demonstrate explicitly. Correspondingly, the
search for the most optimal blackjack basic strategy will be most accurate in the setup
where the gradient of the strategy fit function is made large.
To further test our approach we also looked at evolution of the population of
strategies which have been initialized identically to the Thorp’s basic strategy. Similarly
to what we have done for the initially random population of strategies, we have evolved
this population of the Thorp’s strategies for 1000 rounds. The resulting strategy has
converged to a slightly different mutation. We then compared performance of the
Thorp’s basic strategy and the evolved Thorp’s basic strategy, by running N = 105
rounds of play with b = $2 bet per round. This test demonstrated that the evolved
Thorp’s strategy has a statistically significantly better performance. At the same time,
running N = 104 rounds of play, is not enough to make a statistically significant
statement for the difference between the Thorp’s and the evolved Thorp’s strategies
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performance, in agreement with the observation described above.
The optimal basic strategy depends on the specific rules which the casino sets. We
review the rules in section 2, and provide a brief summary here. The rules which we
follow in this paper are quite favorable for the player. Specifically, dealer stands on soft
17, the natural pays 3:2, money don’t exchange hands at the draw (push), player can
double down on any original hand (except for 21), player can split any hand, player
cannot double down on split aces (but can double down on other split pairs), player can
hit each hand of split aces at most once, player cannot split again the split hands, a
single deck of cards is used. For most of the basic strategy estimates we reshuffle the
deck after it has been depleted by one third. A single player plays against the dealer in
all of our simulations. Player never takes an insurance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we start by reviewing the
blackjack rules. We then discuss the Thorp’s basic strategy and evaluate its performance.
We look at the player’s final bankroll after a large number of betting rounds, and discuss
the performance of the double down and split prescriptions. In section 3 we outline the
basic principles for the evolutionary selection of strategies which we designed and used
in this paper. We also discuss the appropriate choice of the evolution parameters, such
as the selection rate (the fraction of the most fit strategies which are selected in the given
generation and are chosen for breeding), and the mutation rate of the genes. In section
4 we discuss evolving a population of strategies which have been initialized randomly.
In section 5 we discuss the results of evolving the population of strategies which have
been initially set to the Thorp’s basic strategy. We conclude and discuss our results in
section 6.
2. Performance of the Thorp’s basic strategy
In this section we discuss our results for the performance test of the Thorp’s basic
strategy for the full deck, see [3]. We applied the methods used in this section for
evaluation of the other variants of the (evolved) basic strategies, therefore we start with
a general discussion.
The player starts with B0 = $1000 bankroll. Each round the player bets b = $2.
It plays the game against the dealer for N = 10000 rounds (some of the rounds the
player splits, and plays two hands per round; for the typical basic strategy, such as
Thorp’s, the player splits about 2% of the time; the total number of rounds played is
then about T ' 10200), or until it goes broke. We record the number of times the player
wins/loses/draws in total, the number of splits and double downs, and the number of
won/lost splits and double downs. This simulation is then repeated for M = 1000
times, allowing us to calculate distribution properties of the recorded quantities. We
can judge how successful is the prescribed basic strategy for split/double down, and
whether overall the player ends up with a larger or smaller bankroll.
To evaluate performance of the strategy one could look at the winning percentage
pw = W/T and the losing percentage pl = L/T , where W is the total number of times
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the player won, and L is the total number of times the player lost. We notice, however,
that the pw − pl metric does not actually reflect the true edge of the player, since it
ignores the natural payoffs, and, importantly, the winning rate of the double downs.
One of the important metrics of the strategy’s performance is therefore the edge of its
double downs; clearly the strategy should prescribe to double down only if this edge
is positive for the player. Similarly, the player’s edge should be positive for the split
prescriptions of the strategy. We study these metrics for all the strategies discussed in
this paper.
2.1. Review of the blackjack rules
In this subsection we briefly review the rules of blackjack. The specific rules, as
mentioned in Introduction section, vary between the casinos, and the corresponding
optimal strategies vary as well. The game is played by one or several players against
the dealer. The dealer deals the cards from a single deck or a shoe, the latter is made
of several decks shuffled together. In this paper we consider the situation when only a
single deck is used, and only one player plays against the dealer.
Each card is assigned a numerical value. The number cards are assigned their
corresponding values, the face cards (jack, queen, king) are assigned the value 10, the
player’s ace can be either 1 or 11, depending on the choice of the player. If the hand
(the dealt set of cards) contains an ace which can be counted as 11 without the total
value of the hand going over 21, the hand is called soft, otherwise the hand is called
hard. The goal of the game is to get the total hand value below or equal to 21, avoiding
going over 21 (busting), and having that value strictly higher than the dealer’s value (or
not busting, while having the dealer bust). At the showdown the hand with the highest
value wins. In case of a draw (push) no money exchanges hands.
The cards are dealt in the following order. The dealer deals two cards (typically,
face up) to the players, and two cards to itself. One of the dealer’s cards is dealt face
up, another is dealt face down. Each player then faces the sequence of decisions. If the
player has two cards of the same value, it can split the hand. Variants of the game put
restrictions on what card pairs can be split (say, whether queen and ten can be split),
we will consider the rules in which any pair can be split. If the player splits the hand,
then it should put an equal bet on the table, and then the dealer deals one more card
to each of the split hands. We will consider the rules in which the split hands cannot be
re-split again (which can be asked in case when the split hand is dealt a card in pair).
On the original two-card hand the player can decide to double down on its bet.
Player can also double down on one or both of its split hands. We consider the game
variant in which player cannot double down if the aces were split. If player doubles
down, the dealer deals exactly one more card to the player.
If player doesn’t double down, it can request to stand, in which case it receives no
more cards, or hit, in which case the dealer deals one more card. Player can then ask
to hit until it decides to stand, or until it busts, that is, goes over 21. If aces are dealt,
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player can decide to count aces as 11 or as 1. We consider the game variant in which
player can hit split aces just once.
At the showdown, provided the player hasn’t busted, the dealer flips its down-card
and deals cards to itself until it goes to 17 or higher. The aces of the dealer’s hand are
counted as 11, unless it causes the hand to go over 21. A variant of the game which we
will not be considering in this paper is when the dealer hits the soft 17. Each player
plays against the dealer, and wins if its count is higher than the dealer’s, or if the dealer
busts. If the player busts, then it does not matter whether the dealer would bust as
well, and the round is lost for the player. This rule is what results in the original edge
for the dealer.
If the originally dealt pair of cards is of the value 21, that is, ten and ace, it is
called natural. Natural typically pays at 3:2, unless the dealer also has the natural,
which results in a draw. The pair of the value 21 on the split hands is not considered a
natural. In this paper we consider the rules variant in which the player cannot double
down on the natural (in which case the natural would have been counted as 11 instead),
the latter could be advantageous in some cases, considering that the natural pays 3:2,
and the double down win pays 2:1.
Typically in blackjack if the dealer’s up-card is ace, then the first thing which the
player is allowed to do is to take insurance against the dealer’s hand being a natural.
For insurance the player can put at most half of its original bet, and if the dealer has a
natural (which it then checks right away, without revealing the down-card value if the
hand is not a natural), then the insurance is paid at 2:1. Otherwise the dealer collects
the insurance bet and the round continues. In this paper we consider strategies which
do not take insurance. This is because in situations when only the player’s hand cards
are taken into account (as it is in the basic strategy framework, as contrasted with the
card counting approach), the insurance is at 2%-14.3% disadvantage to the player, see
[3].
2.2. Thorp’s basic strategy
In this section we report the results of the simulation for the Thorp’s basic strategy, see
tables 1, 2. For our purposes it is convenient to represent the strategy prescriptions in
terms of tables filled with ones and zeros, where one indicates that the player should
split/double down/stand, and zero indicates that the player shouldn’t split/shouldn’t
double down/should hit. Notice that some of the table entries are redundant, for
instance, in table 1 for the soft double down the player will never double down on
(A,T), and for the hard double down the player will never double down on the count
of 21. Similarly, in table 2 for the soft stand the counts of 2-11 are redundant, since
every soft hand has one ace counting as 11, making the total score larger than 11. The
last rows in the soft/hard stand tables 2 are also redundant, because the player always
stands on 21. The first two rows of the hard stand and the hard double down tables
are redundant, because the hard count on the original hand of two cards cannot be 2
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and 3. This leaves 620 basic strategy parameters, reducing the original count of 800
parameters.
Some other entries of the strategy tables 1, 2, while not redundant in general, are
redundant for the specifically Thorp’s basic strategy. For instance, since the player is
always prescribed to split aces, and due to the fact that splitting decision has the priority
over doubling down and standing decisions, the first row in the soft double down table
1 is redundant. (Unless it is being applied to the split hand, which we cannot re-split
again; however according to the rules considered in this paper the player cannot double
down on split aces.)
Thorp has pointed out that the hard double down prescription for the player’s count
of 8 is to be voided if player holds (6,2); and player should stand on hard 16, against
dealer’s 10, if holding three or more cards. In case of the Thorp’s basic strategy the
performance change when these subtleties are taken into account is discussed below.
Thorp’s basic strategy prescription for split.
Dealer’s up-card
A 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T
P
la
ye
r’
s
p
ai
re
d
ca
rd
A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
3 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
9 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
T 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thorp’s basic strategy prescription for soft
double down.
Dealer’s up-card
A 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T
P
la
ye
r’
s
ot
h
er
ca
rd
A 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
6 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
T 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 1: Thorp’s basic strategy prescription
for split and soft double down (left), and
for hard double down (right).
Dealer’s up-card
A 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T
P
la
ye
r’
s
co
u
n
t
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
9 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
10 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.3. Performance results
In figure 1 we plot the player’s final bankroll distribution, and the sample player’s
bankroll time series over the course of the game. The mean final bankroll is BT =
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Table 2: Thorp’s basic strategy prescription for soft stand (left) and hard stand (right).
Dealer’s up-card
A 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T
P
la
ye
r’
s
co
u
n
t
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
19 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
20 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Dealer’s up-card
A 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 T
P
la
ye
r’
s
co
u
n
t
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
13 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
14 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
15 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
16 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
17 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
18 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
19 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
20 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
$1051.4, and the standard deviation is s = $232.0, indicating the player’s edge
pe =
BT −B0
btot
' 0.0023 , (1)
that is, 0.23%, where btot = (0.11 × 2b + 0.89 × b)T is the total money bet (in action),
where probability of double down is 0.11, and T ' (1 + 0.02)N is the total number of
rounds played, where 0.02 is the probability of split. The 95% confidence interval for
the player’s final bankroll is [$1037.0, $1065.8], and the corresponding 95% confidence
interval for the player’s edge is [0.16%, 0.29%]. The fact that the Thorp’s estimate for
the player’s edge is 0.12%, outside the 95% confidence interval, probably indicates that
Thorp has used less favorable rules for the player.
We repeated this calculation of player’s final bankroll, as described above, over 100
simulations, collecting 100 means of the final bankroll of M = 1000 games (each game
is T ' 10200 rounds). The mean of the means of the final bankroll is $1058.2, and
the standard deviation is $6.9. The corresponding 95% confidence interval for the mean
of M = 1000 of the Thorp’s basic strategy performance outcomes is [$1056.8, $1059.6].
This indicates the 95% confidence interval for the player’s edge [0.25%, 0.26%].
We also calculated that for the Thorp’s strategy the player’s win probability minus
the player’s loss probability is pw − pl ' −0.018 (where the mean overall win and loss
probabilities are pw = 0.446, pl = 0.464), which indicates the 1.8% casino advantage.
As pointed out above in this section, such a conclusion would be premature, since it
assumes that all the rounds win or lose equally, thereby ignoring the different payoffs of
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Figure 1: Left: Player’s final bankroll after 10000 rounds of game (with about 200
extra split rounds), Right: Player’s bankroll time series in one of the games; played
according to Thorp’s basic strategy (see tables 1, 2) in the simulation described in
section 2. Player starts with $1000 bankroll ands bets $2 per round.
0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60
split win/lose probability
0
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t
Probability of winning (mean=0.48, std=0.03) and losing (mean=0.43, std=0.02)
          split in Thorp's basic strategy
Winning
Losing
0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55
double down win/lose probability
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
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un
t
Probability of winning (mean=0.54, std=0.01) and losing (mean=0.38, std=0.01)
          double down in Thorp's basic strategy
Winning
Losing
Figure 2: Probability of winning/losing split (left) and double down (right) in Thorp’s
basic strategy (see tables 1, 2) in the simulation described in section 2. The mean
probability of split is 0.02, the mean probability of double down is 0.11
the blackjack natural, and the advantage of an optimal double down play. The important
metrics of the strategy performance are the edge of the split and the double down play,
which we present in figure 2.
Taking into account the refinements of the Thorp’s basic strategy, prescribing to
stand on hard 16, against dealer’s 10, when holding 3 or more cards, and not to double
down on (6,2), changes mean player’s bankroll to $1055.1, and standard deviation to
$233.3. We repeated this calculation of player’s final bankroll, as described above,
over 100 simulations. The mean final bankroll is $1057.4, and the standard deviation
is $7.3. The corresponding 95% confidence interval is [0.25%, 0.26%], practically
indistinguishable in the current setting from the result above, which ignored these extra
refinements.
3. Blackjack strategy chromosome and evolutionary selection
Evolutionary programming is a powerful approach to optimization problems for systems
with large number of parameters. In case of the blackjack basic strategy optimization
problem each parameter takes one of the two values (0 or 1), prescribing for the player
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how to act in each particular game situation. ‖ This parametrization of the blackjack
basic strategy can be illustrated by the Thorp’s basic strategy, discussed in section 2,
see tables 1, 2, which we can serialize into the vector v,
v = [vsplit, vsoft dd, vhard dd, vsoft stand, vhard stand] , (2)
of the dimension d = 100 + 100 + 200 + 200 + 200 = 800. We choose each matrix
to be serialized row-by-row. The brute force search over these parameters would take
2d ' 10240 steps, making it unfeasible for any reasonable computational power.
It is therefore natural to try to tackle the problem of finding the optimal (or close
to the optimal) blackjack strategy by the evolutionary programming approach. In this
section we describe our evolutionary selection method, applied to the population of the
blackjack strategy chromosomes. We will use the evolutionary algorithm described in
this section to evolve the population of initially random blackjack strategies in section 4,
and the population of strategies identically initialized to the Thorp’s basic strategy in
section 5.
In the evolutionary programming the strategy vector (2) takes the role of the
chromosome, and its entries are assigned the role of genes. Some of the genes have a
phenotypic expression by indicating to the player how to act in the corresponding game
situation. In the specific parametrization (2) some of the genes have no phenotypic
expression, as discussed in section 2. For instance, the first ten rows of the soft stand
matrix (encoded in the first 100 values of its serialized representation vsoft stand) are never
used to make a decision during the game. This is because they correspond to the player’s
count from 2 to 11 in the soft hand, while the soft hand’s count is always larger than
11.
Some of the genes, even under an optimized chromosome design, might end up
with a suppressed phenotypic expression. For instance, if the basic strategy prescribes
to double down on the hard count of 11, then it does not matter what the hard stand
genes are for the count of 11 (when applied to the count of 11 on the originally dealt
hand of two cards) because the decision to double down is taken before the decision to
stand. It is interesting to consider the chromosome choice where some of the genes are
superfluous for the game decision making, and see what values those genes will have in
evolved chromosomes. We will see that in the most cases an evolved population will have
some genes with no phenotypic expression having the values of 1 or 0, almost identically
for the entire population. This can be explained by noticing that some of those genes
might have been selected at an earlier stages of evolution, and then have persisted
throughout the rest of the evolution by just being successful at replicating themselves.
Indeed, if the population has, for instance, the given gene being predominantly equal to
1, it is natural to expect that the winning chromosomes will also happen to have that
gene being equal to 1, and have that gene more likely to reproduce and propagate as 1.
‖ This specific parametrization of the problem ignores the subtle distinctions, such as, e.g., what
specific cards make the given total hand value.
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We need to decide how we are going to rate each strategy chromosome v. In the
evolutionary computation terms we need to decide on the fitness function f(v), which
will return a score number for each particular strategy. To calculate a fit value for the
strategy we need to simulate a game using that strategy. In this paper we chose to
play the game with a single player against the dealer for N = 104 rounds. Some of the
rounds will be split, which for the evolved strategies amounts to adding about 2% more
games, making the total number of games played about T ' 10200.
We select the players ending up with a higher final bankroll BT . More precisely,
we chose the return on the player’s bankroll,
φ =
BT −B0
B0
, (3)
as the fit score f(v), where all the players start with the same bankroll B0 = $10
4 (this
choice of the initial bankroll of the evolving strategies is an order of magnitude higher
than the initial bankroll $103 chosen in the tests of the optimal and evolved strategies,
because the strategies in the earlier stages of evolution will lose a lot of money), and
bet b = $2 per round. The most fit strategies will reasonably be chosen as the strategies
which make the most money. We let the specific ways in which the strategy achieves
this goal be implicit, and optimized over the course of evolutionary selection.
The evolutionary selection happens according to the following algorithm. We
initialize a population of M = 5000 agents, each endowed with a chromosome vi,
i = 1, . . . ,M . This chromosome vi is a vector of the length d = 800, each of its entries
(genes) is either 0 or 1. The phenotypic expression of the chromosome is determined
by first parsing it into five vectors (2), and then de-serializing (we have chosen the row-
by-row convention) each vector into a matrix. Those matrices tell the player how to
act, where the value of 1 of the matrix entry gives the answer ‘yes’, and 0 gives the
answer ‘no’, to the question of whether the player should split/double down/stand in
the corresponding game situation. This is illustrated by tables 1, 2, on example of the
Thorp’s basic strategy, for instance, the table 1 indicates that the player should double
down on the soft hand (A,6) against the dealer’s up-card being 2.
The initial population of strategies can be initialized randomly, or to some specific
values. It is interesting to consider a population of chromosomes, each initialized
without any strategy preconception, assigning to each of its genes a value of 0 or 1
with 50-50% probability. We will look at evolution of such a system in section 4. In
section 5 we attempt to optimize the Thorp’s basic strategy, and study the question
of its evolutionary stability. To this end, we will initialize a population of the Thorp’s
strategies, and allow it to evolve.
Each strategy vi plays the game against the dealer for N = 10
4 rounds (the actual
number of rounds played will be T ' 10200, due to some split rounds), starting from the
same bankroll B0 = $10
4, and betting b = $2 per round. The strategies are then sorted
according to their performance, using the score (3), reflecting their money finishes. We
select the fraction
α = 0.05 (4)
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of the most fit strategies. The selection rate α should be small enough to select the most
optimal strategies and avoid noise coming from un-fit chromosome mutations, but not
too small, so as to avoid overfitting (such as, picking a small statistically insignificant
number of ‘lucky’ strategies). The 1 − α of the least fit strategies are discarded from
the population.
We then breed the selected αM strategies, until they replenish the population to the
size M , by producing (1−α)M offsprings. Each offspring is produced from two parents.
To achieve this we select two different parents i, j, with the probabilities proportional
to their fit scores,
pi =
φi∑αM
j=1 φj
. (5)
This way the more fit strategies will be selected for breeding more frequently, which is
a natural setting.
Once two parent chromosomes vi, vj, are chosen for breeding, they produce one
offspring chromosome c according to the following rule. Each gene ca, a = 1, . . . , d of the
offspring chromosome gets its value (0 or 1) depending on the value of the corresponding
genes vai , v
a
j of the parents’s chromosomes. If v
a
i = v
a
j , then c
a is assigned this same
value, ca = vai = v
a
j , with the probability
pi = 1− 10−4 . (6)
With the probability 1−pi = 10−4 the ca will mutate, getting assigned the flipped value,
ca = (1 + vai )%2. At the mutation rate (6) each gene in the population of M = 5000
chromosomes will take two generations on average to mutate. In the setup of section
5, where we start with the population of identical chromosomes, the second generation
will have about Md(1− pi) = 400 mutated genes.
Increasing the mutation probability 1 − pi speeds up the evolution, but makes
it saturate to a sub-optimal value. We want 1 − pi to be large enough to have an
evolution happening relatively fast, but small enough to prevent destruction of the good
chromosomes and avoid convergence of the evolution to a sub-optimal performance.
If the parents have a different genes at the slot a, vai 6= vaj , then the child’s gene ca
is assigned the value of one of its parents’s genes, with the probabilities determined by
the fit scores.¶
We select pairs of parents from the original αM of the most fit strategies for the
total of (1 − α)M times, replenishing the total count of the population to M . For the
current generation we save the mean score
φˆ =
1
αM
αM∑
i=1
φ(i) , (7)
¶ Unlike selection of the parents for breeding with the probabilities (5) proportional to their fit scores,
selecting a gene over its allele with the probability proportional to its fit score is an upgrade compared
to the natural selection. In nature it is not reasonable to expect that an advantageous phenotypic
expression of the gene also coincides with it being more likely to be chosen in the meiosis, and dominate
over the corresponding gene of the other parent.
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Figure 3: Time dependence of the mean fit score, in the evolution of the random
strategies in section 4. The fit score is defined as the return of the α = 0.05 of the most
fit strategies, according to (7).
Figure 4: Mean split outcome in section 4, starting from a population of 5000 random
strategies after 1000 rounds of evolution. The columns represent the dealer’s up-card,
the rows represent the card in pair. The mean is taken over 5% of the most fit strategies.
of the αM most fit strategies. From the the dependence of the score φˆ(t) on the number
of the evolution steps t we can observe convergence of the evolutionary selection. The
evolution should be run until at least the score (7) saturates.
4. Evolving random strategies
In this section we study evolution of the population of blackjack strategies which have
been initialized randomly. The evolution is done according to the algorithm discussed
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Figure 5: Mean soft double down outcome in section 4, starting from a population
of 5000 random strategies after 1000 rounds of evolution. The columns represent the
dealer’s up-card, the rows represent the non-ace card of the player. The mean is taken
over 5% of the most fit strategies.
Figure 6: Mean hard double down outcome in section 4, starting from a population
of 5000 random strategies after 1000 rounds of evolution. The columns represent the
dealer’s up-card, the rows represent the player’s hand count. The mean is taken over
5% of the most fit strategies.
in section 3. As we will see in this section, the impressive result is that the evolution
relatively quickly finds a strategy which performs (almost) as well as the Thorp’s basic
strategy, discussed in section 2, and agrees quite with the Thorp’s basic strategy in some
of the specifics.
To make an exhaustive and complete search we run the evolution over τ = 1000
generations. We use the evolutionary selection parameters as described in section 3,
that is, we use the selection rate (4), and the propagation rate (6). We evolve the
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Figure 7: Mean soft stand outcome in section 4, starting from a population of 5000
random strategies after 1000 rounds of evolution. The columns represent the dealer’s
up-card, the rows represent the player’s hand count. The mean is taken over 5% of the
most fit strategies.
Figure 8: Mean hard stand outcome in section 4, starting from a population of 5000
random strategies after 1000 rounds of evolution. The columns represent the dealer’s
up-card, the rows represent the player’s hand count. The mean is taken over 5% of the
most fit strategies.
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population of M = 5000 strategies, and reset the bankroll of all the strategies to $104
at the beginning of each generation. + The resulting mean fit score (7) is plotted in
figure 3.
Notice that the saturation value of the fit score in figure 3 indicates that the
fit strategies make about $540 after T ' 104 rounds of betting $2. The apparent
discrepancy from the more modest result of making about $50 by playing the Thorp’s
basic strategy (see figure 1) is due to the artifact of using the highest performed 5% of
the 5000 strategies in the given round of evolution to calculate the mean return. From
the distribution of the player’s finishes in figure 1 one can see that the top 5% indeed
make about $500 on average.
We output the mean evolved basic strategy by calculating the weighted average of
the top αM = 250 strategies. For the weights we use the fit scores of those strategies.
The results for the split, soft/hard double down, and the soft/hard stand evolved mean
strategies are provided in figures 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.
As was pointed out in section 3, some of the genes in the selected strategy
parametrization have no phenotypic expression. For instance, the first ten rows in the
mean soft stand table 7 have no influence on the way the game which uses that table is
played. This is because the soft hand by definition contains an ace which can be counted
as 11, and therefore its score can be only 12 and higher. It is illustrative to observe
how some of those genes on average have the values of 0.99/0, seemingly asserting to a
significance of having 1/0 in that location. This is, however, an example of how a gene
can survive just because it happens to be good at replication: a chance occurrence of
having a majority of 1/0 in that chromosome location in the given subset of the most
fit strategies might reinforce itself and converge to having a uniformly found 1/0 in that
chromosome slot. This statement is confirmed by running repeated evolution simulations
and observing that the values of 1/0 are found randomly in different chromosome slots (in
the subset of genes with no phenotypic expression), for different evolutionary outcomes.
Taking into account irrelevance of the spurious genes with no phenotypic expression
we then notice that the standing prescription for both the soft and the hard hands
agree well for the Thorp’s strategy, see table 2, and the evolved strategy, see figures
7, 8. Comparing these strategy tables we should also keep in mind that the decisions
to split and to double down, when splitting and doubling down is incorporated into
the basic strategy, is to be done before the decision to hit/stand. For instance, the
evolved strategy prescribes to double down on (A,7) against dealer’s 2, on (A,8) against
dealer’s 5, and on (A,7) against dealer’s 6, see figure 5. This will suppress significance
of expression of zero entries for the player’s soft count 18 against dealer’s 2, 19 against
dealer’s 5, and 18 against dealer’s 6, in the soft stand table 7. One might wonder what
happens when, for instance, we consider standing with soft 18 made of three cards, such
+ If we don’t reset the bankroll at the beginning of each evolutionary round, the bankroll score of the
most fit strategies will go into the linear regime after the large number of evolutionary steps. Also,
in the beginning of evolution, the sub-optimal but lucky strategies will get a persisting undeserved
advantage in the selection, creating a noise and slowing down the evolution.
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Figure 9: Left: Player’s final bankroll after 10000 rounds of game (with about 200
extra split rounds), Right: Player’s bankroll time series in one of the games; played
according to evolved basic strategy (see figures 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, with entries taken to be
1 for the mean larger than or equal to 0.95) in the simulation described in section 4.
Player starts with $1000 bankroll ands bets $2 per round.
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Figure 10: Probability of winning/losing split (left) and double down (right) in evolved
basic strategy, see figures 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, with entries taken to be 1 for the mean larger
than or equal to 0.95) in the simulation described in section 4. The mean probability
of split is 0.01, the mean probability of double down is 0.12.
as (A,5,2), against dealer’s 6, in which case the decision to double down is not considered
(player can double down only on the originally dealt hand of two cards). In such cases
we notice, however, that the player will in fact likely double down before getting to that
hand, say, both (A,5) and (A,2) against dealer’s 6 are prescribed to double down on by
the table 5.
Similarly the apparent standing prescriptions, which the soft stand table 7 indicates
for player’s count against dealer’s up-card, at (13,2), (14,2), (16,2), (13,3), (14,5), (15,5),
(13,6), (17,6), are suppressed due to the corresponding priority of the soft double down
prescriptions by the table 5. At the same time, splitting prescription for aces, due to
figure 4, suppresses significance of the soft stand entries (12,2) and (12,4) of the table
7. We also notice that the (9,4) and (9,5) prescriptions of the hard stand table 8 are
suppressed by the prescriptions to double down on hard 9 against dealer’s 4 and 5, due
to the hard double down table 6. The hard stand prescription at (4,8) in figure 8 will
be suppressed by the prescription to split pair of 2 against dealer’s 8 due to figure 4.
We also ran a separate calculation for 100 evolutionary steps, for the strategies
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which never split and never double down. The rest of the evolutionary conditions were
the same as set above. This allows to test whether the evolutionary selection can find the
correct standing prescription, and avoid having standing prescriptions being suppressed
by the split and double down prescriptions, as discussed above. We confirmed that
the resulting evolved strategy has the standing prescription agreeing with the Thorp’s
prescription, shown in table 2. This suggest that an alternative way to learn the basic
strategy evolutionary would be to evolve the correct standing, doubling down, and
splitting prescriptions separately, in that order. For instance, after having learned the
correct standing prescription, we could use it while learning the correct prescription for
doubling down (while still omitting the splits). We will not be using such an approach
in this paper, preferring to evolve the whole strategy simultaneously.
We then notice that while some of the prescriptions for the split and the soft/hard
double down agree for the Thorp’s and the evolved basic strategies (for instance, the
evolved basic strategy has learned to always split aces and never split fives and tens),
some distinctions nevertheless exist.∗ Some of the apparent distinctions are spurious,
for instance, the apparent prescription to double down on hard 4 against dealer’s 3 and
5, indicated by figure 6, is suppressed by prescription of figure 4 to split pair of 2, against
dealer’s 3 and 5.
To analyze an impact of more essential distinctions we run simulation tests of the
evolved strategy, similar to those we did in section 2 for the Thorp’s basic strategy.
First we need to decide on how to choose the basic strategy from the mean strategies
4, 5, 6, 7, 8. The most straightforward way is to take the entry value to be 1 if the
corresponding mean gene is greater than or equal to some threshold value a. In this
section we choose a = 0.95 for such a threshold.
We present the results in figures 9, 10. Comparing figures 2 and 10 for the Thorp’s
basic strategy and the evolved basic strategy split performance, we notice that the split
prescription in the evolved strategy has a higher winning edge (8%) than its counterpart
in the Thorp’s strategy (5%). However, the evolved strategy split prescription results in
splitting of about 1% of the hands, while the Thorp’s split strategy results in splitting
of about 2% of the hands.
From figure 9 we see that the mean player’s bankroll, when using the evolved basic
strategy, is comparable to the Thorp’s result. Specifically, the player’s final bankroll
mean and standard deviation are BT = $1057.1, s = $229.6, giving the 95% confidence
interval for the final bankroll [$1042.9, $1071.3], and for the player’s edge, [0.19%, 0.32%].
We can perform a t-test quantifying the difference in performance of the Thorp’s
basic strategy and the evolved basic strategy. We perform the test of the hypothesis
that the two distributions have the same mean. To this end we calculate the t-statistic
t =
B¯Thorp − B¯Evolved
s
√
1
nThorp
+ 1
nEvolved
= −0.55 , (8)
∗ For instance, in agreement with [6] our strategies learned to doubled down on the (A,8) against
dealer’s 5 and 6, as contrasted with the Thorp’s basic strategy.
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Figure 11: Comparison of the Thorp’s basic strategy and the evolved basic strategy.
Both histograms are obtained by running 100 simulations where in each simulation we
play 1000 games and calculate the mean final bankroll (over the entire population).
where we substituted the pooled standard deviation (assuming that both distributions
have the same standard deviation)
s =
√
(nThorp − 1)s2Thorp + (nEvolved − 1)s2Evolved
nThorp + nEvolved − 2 , (9)
with the parameters
B¯Thorp = $1051.4 , sThorp = $232.0 , nThorp = 1000 , (10)
B¯Evolved = $1057.1 , sEvolved = $229.6 , nEvolved = 1000 , (11)
The t in (8) has t-distribution with nThorp+nEvolved−2 = 1998 degrees of freedom, giving
about 42% confidence that the mean values B¯Thorp and B¯Evolved come from distributions
with different means. This is in no way an assertive statement that the evolved strategy
has a different performance mean than the Thorp’s basic strategy.
Running 100 simulations, equivalent to those used to produce figure 9, and
averaging out the so-obtained 100 means, we obtain the mean bankroll $1049.1, and
the standard deviation $7.4. This is to be compared with the Thorp’s performance,
calculated in section 2, which gives the mean $1058.2, and the standard deviation of
$6.9, as we illustrate in figure 11.
Our results for both the Thorp’s and the evolved strategy similarly successful
performance suggest that the there is an entire region in the parameter space of the
basic strategy, containing the strategies performing similarly well. This is true at least
when these strategies are considered in the framework with the given bet size, b = $2,
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Figure 12: Time dependence of the mean fit score, in the evolution of the Thorp’s
strategies in section 5. The fit score is defined as the return of the α = 0.05 of the most
fit strategies, according to (7).
and the number of rounds played, N = 104, used to quantify the performance. When
the bet size b and the number of rounds played N is taken to be larger, penalization of
the deviation from the most optimal basic strategy can be made as large as possible. In
other words, the gradient of the basic strategy fit function φ, see (3), in the direction of
any given parameter of the basic strategy should be sufficiently large for the evolutionary
pressure to act on that parameter.
We confirm this by testing both the Thorp’s basic strategy and the evolved basic
strategy by running simulations with N = 105 rounds of game, with b = $2 bet per
game. The player starts with $5000. The mean final bankroll over M = 1000 games is
$5578.3, and the standard deviation is $724.9 for the Thorp’s basic strategy. For the
evolved basic strategy the mean final bankroll is $5455.4, and the standard deviation
is $705.1. The corresponding t-value of the statistic (8) is 3.8, giving 99.9% confidence
that these two bankroll values come from distributions with different means, agreeing
with what is shown in figure 11.
5. Evolving Thorp’s basic strategy
In section 4 we calculated the evolved basic strategy by starting from a population
of randomly initialized strategies. We noticed that the resulting basic strategy, while
largely similar to the Thorp’s basic strategy, has nevertheless a few differences from it.
The money performance of the Thorp’s and the evolved basic strategy is quite similar,
when evaluated by playing N = 104 games of b = $2 bet per game. This suggests
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Figure 13: Mean split outcome in section 5, starting from a population of 5000 Thorp’s
strategies after 1000 rounds of evolution. The columns represent the dealer’s up-card,
the rows represent the card in pair. The mean is taken over 5% of the most fit strategies.
Figure 14: Mean soft double down outcome in section 5, starting from a population
of 5000 Thorp’s strategies after 1000 rounds of evolution. The columns represent the
dealer’s up-card, the rows represent the non-ace card of the player. The mean is taken
over 5% of the most fit strategies.
that deviations in a certain vicinity of the Thorp’s basic strategy are not very strongly
penalized, when the number of games played to evaluate the strategy fit (and the size
of the bets) is not very large. On the other hand, as we have shown in section 4,
when evaluated by playing N = 105 games, the Thorp’s strategy shows a statistically
significant advantage over the evolved strategy.
Therefore in order to optimize performance of the evolved strategy, we need to use a
larger number of games to evaluate a strategy in the population. This will substantially
increase the amount of time required for an evolutionary optimization. To circumvent
this issue we can start evolving from the Thorp’s basic strategy, and address the question
of its evolutionary stability.
To this end we initialize population of the Thorp’s strategies 1, 2 and let it evolve
for τ = 1000 rounds. All the evolutionary parameters are chosen to be exactly the same
as in section 4, in particular we will be using N = 104 rounds of play of b = $2 bet each
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Figure 15: Mean hard double down outcome in section 5, starting from a population
of 5000 Thorp’s strategies after 1000 rounds of evolution. The columns represent the
dealer’s up-card, the rows represent the player’s hand count. The mean is taken over
5% of the most fit strategies.
Figure 16: Mean soft stand outcome in section 5, starting from a population of 5000
Thorp’s strategies after 1000 rounds of evolution. The columns represent the dealer’s
up-card, the rows represent the player’s hand count. The mean is taken over 5% of the
most fit strategies.
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Figure 17: Mean hard stand outcome in section 5, starting from a population of 5000
Thorp’s strategies after 1000 rounds of evolution. The columns represent the dealer’s
up-card, the rows represent the player’s hand count. The mean is taken over 5% of the
most fit strategies.
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Figure 18: Left: Player’s final bankroll after 10000 rounds of game (with about 200
extra split rounds), Right: Player’s bankroll time series in one of the games; played
according to evolved Thorp’s basic strategy (see figures 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, with entries
taken to be 1 for the mean larger than or equal to 0.95) in the simulation described in
section 5. Player starts with $1000 bankroll ands bets $2 per round.
to rank the strategies.
In figure 12 we plot time dependence of the mean fit score (7) of the population. We
notice that performance improves, transitioning between the two (meta-)stable values,
due to a spreading favorable mutation. This is to be contrasted with the gradual
evolution of the initially random strategies, shown in figure 3. This is because there
are many ways to start optimizing the originally random strategy. While the Thorp’s
basic strategy is already very well optimized, and it takes some time to find and spread
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Figure 19: Probability of winning/losing split (left) and double down (right) in evolved
Thorp’s basic strategy, see figures 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, with entries taken to be 1 for the
mean larger than or equal to 0.95) in the simulation described in section 5. The mean
probability of split is 0.01, the mean probability of double down is 0.11.
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Figure 20: Comparison of the Thorp’s basic strategy and the basic strategy obtained
by evolution of the Thorp’s basic strategy. Both histograms are obtained by running
100 simulations where in each simulation we play 1000 games and calculate the mean
final bankroll (over the entire population).
those rare mutations which can optimize it even further. The later steps of the random
strategies evolution in figure 3, when zoomed in, also appear like evolution shown in
figure 12.
The result of running 1000 rounds of evolution is presented in figures 13, 14, 15,
16, 17, where we provide de-serialized mean strategy chromosome for αM = 250 of the
most fit chromosomes. As in section 4 we used the fit scores as the weights to calculate
the mean strategy.
As in section 4 we can choose a specific strategy from the mean strategy, by setting
a gene to be 1 if the corresponding mean gene is larger than a = 0.95, and setting it
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to 0 otherwise. There are a very few distinctions between the resulting evolved Thorp’s
strategy and the original Thorp’s strategy 1, 2. Contrasted with the original Thorp’s
strategy, the evolved strategy does not recommend to split (6,6) against dealer’s 6 and
(7,7) against dealer’s 8. Evolved Thorp’s strategy also recommends to double down on
(A,7) against dealer’s 2, and does not recommend to double down on hard 11 against
dealer’s ace. Among inessential mutations, the mean (6,5) gene in the soft stand matrix
being equal to 0.98, has no phenotypic expression, because the soft count starts with
12.
Performance of the resulting strategy is plotted in figures 18, 19. From figure
18 we conclude that the mean player’s bankroll $1065.6 and the standard deviation
$234.6 imply the 95% confidence interval [$1051.0, $1080.2] for the player’s bankroll,
and [0.23%, 0.36%] for the player’s edge.
We can perform a t-test quantifying the difference in performance of the Thorp’s
basic strategy and the evolved Thorp’s basic strategy, similarly to (8), giving about 83%
confidence that the mean values of the player’s final bankroll in the Thorp’s and the
evolved Thorp’s strategy tests come from distributions with different means. This does
not seem to be conclusive enough that the evolved Thorp’s strategy has a superior
performance to the Thorp’s strategy. In figure 20 we compare performance of the
Thorp’s basic strategy and the evolved basic strategy. This is analogous to our earlier
comparison of 100 mean bankrolls, see figure 11, between the basic strategy evolved
from the random population in section 4, and the Thorp’s basic strategy.
In order to obtain a more significant statistical test of the difference between the
Thorp’s and the evolved Thorp’s basic strategy, we run a simulation 1000 times, with
N = 105 rounds of game, of b = $2 bet each game. We start with the player’s bankroll
of $5000. The resulting final’s player’s bankroll for the Thorp’s strategy has the mean
$5578.3, and standard deviation $724.9. The mean final bankroll for the evolved Thorp’s
strategy is $5738.4, and the standard deviation is $733.4. The corresponding t-value
for the difference, (8), is equal to −4.9, indicating 99.9% confidence that the evolved
Thorp’s strategy has the higher mean edge than the Thorp’s strategy.
6. Conclusions and discussion
In this paper we studied systematically the evolutionary programming approach to the
selection of an optimal basic strategy for playing blackjack. We demonstrated that
under the specific blackjack rules chosen in this paper the basic strategy for one full
deck, proposed in [3], has about 0.26% edge in favor of the player. We suggest that our
methodology can be applied to other variations of the blackjack rules, analogously to
[6].
We demonstrated that evolutionary selection can quickly (in about 100 generations)
saturate to an optimal strategy which performs similarly well to known basic strategies
in the literature, such as the Thorp’s basic strategy. We have addressed the question
of the distinctions between the Thorp’s basic strategy and the evolved basic strategy,
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and suggested that there’s an entire subset of parameters with the corresponding basic
strategies having apparently a similar performance, when the number of rounds played
and the bet size are taken small enough. The difference in performance becomes visible
only when the number of rounds of play/size of bet are scaled up. We confirmed this
statement explicitly, by increasing the number of rounds played to evaluate the strategy
performance from 104 to 105. This resulted in a statistically significant difference
between the strategies.
To further test our approach we have looked at evolution of the population of
strategies originally initialized to the Thorp’s basic strategy. We observed that in the
considered setup it took about 500 evolutionary steps to create and spread a favorable
mutation, which improves performance of the population. The improvement has been
shown to be statistically insignificant, when tested on 104 rounds of play, and statistically
significant, when tested on 105 rounds of play. The evolved Thorp’s strategy gives the
player about 0.33% edge. It would be interesting to extend the approach discussed in this
paper to the framework which would allow to take into account a specific composition
of the player’s hand, further refining the basic strategy.
The methods proposed in this paper can be used to calculate optimal blackjack
strategies for the deck with removed ranks. Such an approach is an evolutionary
counterpart of the simulation method originally used by Thorp to determine the effect
of removal of some cards from the deck on the edge of the player, who uses the
corresponding optimal strategy, see [3]. We have performed this analysis elsewhere
and found that evolutionary selection acting on the population of strategies initialized
randomly optimizes the best strategy in a few hundreds of evolutionary steps, adapting
to the conditions of the deck with removed cards. Our results for the player’s edge in
games with deck with removed ranks agree well with the results of [3].
The results in this paper have been generated using the code written by the author
in C++ and Python. The original code is published on the author’s GitHub page, and
can also be requested by contacting the author. On MacBook Pro 3.3GHz Intel Core i7
(2016) it took about 100 seconds to calculate one generation of evolution (5000 games)
in sections 4, 5, and about 20 seconds to test a typical strategy for 1000 games with
about 10200 rounds each in sections 2, 4, 5.
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